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When Mediated Poverty Stereotypes align with Public Opinion: 
A Clear Predictor of Ideology and Party in the U.S. 
 
 Why are people poor?  That question has filled books and journal articles, studies 
covering fields ranging from public policy to sociology to economics.  However, the 
question itself, or more precisely poll respondent answers to it, may represent a clear 
dividing line in the U.S. electorate.   
Lakoff (2002, 2004) has pointed out that American conservatives take a “stern 
father” approach to understanding the world around them.  The world is a dangerous 
place.  People have bad instincts and must be taught right.  People who are successful 
have achieved such status by moral uprightness and good choices.  People who are not 
well off, conversely, are in such a state because of some personal or moral failing.  
Liberals or progressives in the Lakoff analysis follow more of a nurturing family model, 
seeing societal links and multiple causations. 
Mediated portrayals of poverty also very likely play a role in public opinion about 
causes.  Other researchers have critiqued well the failings in mediated portrayals of 
poverty, specifically how those portrayals skew toward urban, African American, and 
personal failings frames.  This paper will present some of those findings, as well as other 
results that link mediated portrayals to how people assign causality regarding poverty, 
personal failings or societal problems.  This paper, however, will test a final link—how 
those views of “why are people poor” represent a clear cleavage in the American 
electorate. Secondary analyses of polls on the matter, including a national poll on race, 
will be used to test the strength of that link.  That is the purpose of this study. 
 
Literature Review: Mediated Messages about Poverty and Race 
 
Gilens (1996) conducted a substantial content analysis of the 1988-1992 images 
of race and poverty presented in nightly network newscasts and three major news 
magazines.  This yielded 635 people in 560 still photos in 182 stories related to poverty, 
1100 people in a random subset of 50 out of 534 TV news stories.  In both media the poor 
presented were substantially more likely to be African American than the actual national 
percentage of black poor.  Further, the most sympathetic impoverished subgroups  
(elderly and working poor) were underrepresented while unemployed working-age adults, 
the least sympathetic group, were overrepresented. 
Gould, Stern, and Adams (1981) looked at primetime TV entertainment shows 
and found few images of poverty, and those that existed were of a sentimentalized, 
simple, and happy deprivation.  Another analysis looked at the text of eleven Newsweek 
articles about welfare, finding the articles were dominated by a conservative view that 
stresses victims’ failures (de Goede, 1996).  Clawson and Kegler (2000) found that even 
in college textbooks poverty is raced coded as a “black problem” and that view is 
bolstered by stereotypical images of the poor. 
Two separate analyses (Cloud, 1998; Clawson and Trice, 2000) found the 
stereotypes about race and poverty cycled through federal politics in the early 1990s.  Bill 
Clinton’s 1992 pledge to “end welfare as we know it” and the congressional Republicans’ 
“Personal Responsibility Act” both built on mediated stereotypes about race and poverty.  
Cloud (1998) concluded the “family values” language of both constructs the family as the 
site of all responsibility and change, privatizing social responsibility for ending poverty 
and racism, Lakoff’s conservative stern-father model moving easily from media to 
policy.   
Media source as well as story framing may play a role in how much poverty/race 
stereotype is adopted by the news consumer.  Iyengar (1990) found that when news 
media frame poverty in general terms about outcomes, the public assigns responsibility to 
society.  When news presentations present an example of a particular poor person, 
respondents then assign causality to a failing in that individual.  Sotirovic (2001) found 
that viewer use of cable TV news and entertainment shows correlated with greater 
perception of welfare recipients as non-white and young, and higher estimated of federal 
spending on welfare.  This she blames on contextually poor, event centered, and overly 
personalized approach of said programs.  Person who read public affairs content in 
newspapers or watched more “thematic” stories about welfare and poverty not only had 
more accurate perceptions of the dimensions of poverty, but also greater support for 
welfare programs. 
 
Literature Review: Public Opinion Studies and a Working Theory 
 
One study of early public opinion poll data (Newman & Jacobs, 2007) looked at 
attitudes toward the poor during the Depression and the subsequent New Deal.  It found 
"the jobless were regarded with suspicion, immigrants should be forced to 'go home,' 
women belong in the kitchen not on the shop floor.  The harsher the economic conditions 
(by state), the more conservative were public attitudes.  Hence New Deal legislative 
victories accrued despite rather than because of public support" (p. 6). 
The link between ideology and answers to "why poor" also appears to be cross-
cultural.  Wagstaff (1983) studied attitudes toward the poor among male and female 
respondents in Liverpool and Glasgow, and using MacDonald's Poverty Scale and the 
Protestant Ethic Scale.  He found supporters of the British Conservative Party more likely 
to blame the poor for their plight.  Labour Party supporters were much less likely to do 
so.  Supporters of the Liberal/SDF Alliance fell somewhere in between.  Similarly 
Pandey et al (1982) found those in India with a right-wing orientation take more negative 
attitudes toward the poor than those with a left-wing orientation. 
The correlation of “why poor” answers to political ideology can be seen as a 
logical extension of Attribution Theory.  That theory observes that people have a 
compelling need to explain things, and those explanations tend to break down into causal 
assertions either internal to the self or external to an outside agent or force.  Zucker and 
Weiner (2006) studied attribution of causes of poverty among student and non-student 
samples.  In both samples conservatism correlated positively with individualistic causes 
and negatively with societal causes. 
Beck, Whitley, and Wolk (1999) went one step further and sent a questionnaire to 
Georgia state legislators, asking them to evaluate ten explanations of poverty.  The 74 
respondents out of 236 (31% response rate) represented a good cross-section of the 
different demographics of the legislature.  At significant levels Democrats, women, and 
People of Color viewed low wages and discrimination as more important causes than did 
their counterparts. 
 
Literature Review: Descriptive Data from Polls 
 
Before one re-examines available datasets, however, it would be useful to review 
the descriptive data, the poll numbers on answers to questions about the reasons for 
poverty.  Those polls rather consistently show significant numbers of respondents in both 
the “moral failings” and “social conditions” camps, but with slight majorities or 
pluralities for the moral failings answer. 
The U. S. General Social Survey (Davis, Smith & Marsden, 1990), for example, 
asked the question why are people poor.  When the option “lack of effort by the poor 
themselves” is presented, 46% say that is a very important reason, 45% somewhat 
important, and less than nine percent not important at all.  Furthermore, 39.5% said loose 
morals and drunkenness were a very important reason, 34.9% somewhat important, and 
25.6% not important. 
One specialized poll, a national telephone sampling of more than a thousand U. S. 
Catholics (Davidson, 1995), found 214 respondents blaming poverty on “poor people’s 
own behavior such as not managing their own money,” while 761 chose “social 
conditions such as lack of jobs and low wages.”  Eighty-three said Don’t Know. 
The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life Survey (2002) conducted a split 
sample, asking one group the bigger reason why American children are being raised in 
poverty, and another group the specific why ten million American children are being 
raised in poverty.  The two groups did not differ in responses.  Half chose “failure of the 
parents as individuals” while 31% opted for “social and economic problems, and thirteen 
to fourteen percent volunteering “Both.”  
Similar numbers emerged when Global Strategy Group (2005) polled Americans 
on behalf of the Foundation for Ethnic Understanding.  The question was “Do you think 
poor people in this country are poor because of reasons that are largely under their own 
control [47%] or because of reasons that are largely out of their control [41%]?”  Ten 
percent said Don’t Know, and two percent refused. 
One previous nationwide telephone survey (NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy School, 2001), 
conducted in English and Spanish, took the unusual step of breaking down reported 
answers by income group.  The sample included 294 respondents with an income less 
than the federal poverty level, 613 with an income of between 100% and 200% of the 
federal poverty level, and 1,045 with an income above 200% of the federal poverty level. 
Results for the groups were weighted to reflect the actual distribution in the nation. 
All were asked “which is the bigger cause of poverty today - that people are not 
doing enough to help themselves out of poverty, or that circumstances beyond their 
control cause them to be poor?”  Some 39% of those who were below the poverty line 
said people were not doing enough to help themselves, but 57% said circumstances.  
Those barely above poverty themselves split 46% circumstances, 44% people not doing 
enough.  Those at twice the poverty line and higher were the only group placing the onus 
on the poor themselves, 50% to 44%. 
The three groups did not differ substantially on direct questions about whether 
poor people lacking motivation was a major cause of poverty, slightly more than half 
called it a major cause and about a third tagged it as a minor cause.   Roughly the same 
pattern held true on “decline in moral values” as a cause, half calling it major, about three 
in ten calling it a minor cause.  The differences were clearer when respondents were 
asked about the most important reason.  The poor were more likely to mention drug 
abuse, medical bills, a shortage of jobs, or jobs that only were part time or paid low 
wages.  Those slightly above poverty also mentioned low pay and drug abuse, but added 
poor quality schools or declining moral values.  The more economically comfortable 
group were most likely to mention lack of motivation or declining moral values, but some 
also choose poor schools or low-pay jobs.   
The public opinion split on reasons for poverty carries over into anti-poverty 
programs, under the generic term welfare.  Of course, welfare long has held a negative 
stigma in the U.S. (Gilens, 1999) and has fostered persistent myths with little relation to 
the reality of poverty (Seccombe, 2007). 
Two polls (Kaiser, 1994; and NBC/Wall Street Journal, 1994) asked fairly similar 
questions about the reasons people were on welfare.  Kaiser found 65% declaring 
recipients “choose not work” a major reason, and 26% a minor reason.  More than seven 
in ten thought a major reason people were on welfare was that it pays better than some 
jobs, and 62% listed as a major reason that women have more babies to get larger checks. 
NBC had 57% of respondents call a decline in moral values a major reason, 20 percent a 
moderately important reason.  Fifty nine percent thought the breakdown of the traditional 
family unit a major reason, 20% moderate.  Fifty three percent said a major reason was 
welfare pays better than some jobs.  Fully half listed as a major reason women having 
babies for larger checks, and one in five called that a moderate reason.  Reasons such as 
not enough jobs and racial discrimination by employers were chosen less often as reasons 
by respondents to both polls.  Poor education scored highly as a reason in the Kaiser poll, 
but not as much in the NBC poll.  
 Negative attitudes toward the poor also appear in historical reflection on anti-
poverty programs.  Schwarz (1988) compiled several studies about “Great Society” anti-
poverty programs, finding that most both achieved their objectives and reduced poverty.  
Not so in public opinion.  A study by Americans Talk Issues Foundation (1994) found 
more respondents (31%) having a negative opinion of the 1960s War on Poverty than 
those having a positive opinion, 22%.  Among those with a negative opinion, 45% said it 
didn’t work to reduce poverty, 22% said it made recipients dependent on welfare, and 
14% complained it created a government bureaucracy. 
 Public assumptions and mythologies about poverty and welfare also dovetail with 
views on immigration, race, and electoral choices.  When one study (Kane, Parsons & 
Associates, 1984) presented respondents with the statement “Most refugees admitted to 
the U.S. wind up on welfare,” 45% agreed and indicated it was a good reason not to let in 
refugees.  Another 19% thought it true but had no relevance; 23% thought it not true, and 
ten percent replied “don’t know.” 
 The General Social Survey has asked the question, “On the average 
(negroes/blacks/African-Americans) have worse jobs, income, and housing than white 
people. Do you think these differences are … [b]ecause most (negroes/blacks/African-
Americans) just don't have the  motivation or willpower to pull themselves up out of 
poverty?  More than 54% of respondents overall replied yes.  One should note the GSS 
first asked the question in 1977, then every year or other year starting in 1985.  The 
percentages initially ran as high as 64.7% yes.  The percentage generally has declined 
with passing years, but in 2006 was still 49.8% agreeing with the statement. 
 When Republicans in 1976 were presented with six reasons for selecting either 
Ronald Reagan or Gerald Ford as their party’s nominee (CBS News/New York Times, 
1976), 13% selected, “He’ll clean up the welfare situation” as their top reason.  That 
trailed “deal more effectively with the economy” (33%) and “less likely to get us into a 
war” (22%), but ran ahead of reduce the size of government, 9%; won’t let us fall behind 
Russia, 7%; less likely to split the party, 5%.  Six percent volunteered “none of these” 
and five percent said “don’t know.” 
 If Lakoff is correct about moral politics, then the following two hypotheses will 
hold true.  Hypothesis One is that those who view themselves as conservatives will 
exhibit the highest levels of viewing poverty as associated with personal moral failure, 
while those viewing themselves as liberal will exhibit the lowest levels of viewing 
poverty as associated with personal moral failure.  Hypothesis Two is that those who self-
identify with the Republican Party will exhibit the highest levels of viewing poverty as 
associated with personal moral failure, while those who self-identify with the Democratic 





The researcher used keyword searches to find polls in which respondents gave 
reasons for poverty or why people were poor.  Roper’s iPoll archive was very useful in 
obtaining some of the descriptive data cited in the literature review.  In addition, the 
researcher obtained the Pew Religion and Public Life and the NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy 
datasets through Roper’s iPoll archive.  Each was imported into a Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) file for data analysis.  The General Social Survey, National 
Race and Politics Survey (Sniderman, Tetlock & Piazza, 1991) and the American 
National Election Survey were available for online analysis through the Survey 
Documentation & Analysis (SDA) archive, http://sda.berkeley.edu/.  The Odum Institute 
had seven metropolitan or state polls with the appropriate variables for this secondary 
analysis.  The Association of Religious Data Archives had three additional useful polls.  
All the Odum and ARDA files were imported into an SPSS file for further analysis. 
The previously mentioned hypotheses were tested using both measures of 
correlation/association and multiple regressions.  The regressions tested “why poor” 
reasons against political philosophy and party identification and viable alternative 
explanations for variance such as age, income, education, and religiosity to test the 
strength of the relationship. 
 
Findings: Correlations and Associations 
 
The U.S. General Social Survey is available online from 1972 to 2006.  
Unfortunately, only in 1990 did GSS ask respondents questions about why people are 
poor.  In the GSS self-identifying as a conservative correlated with attributing poverty to 
lack of effort and loose morals on the part of the poor themselves.  Identifying as a liberal 
correlated with attributing poverty more to poor schools and not enough jobs.  These 
relationships were linear and met a high standard of statistical significance (Table 1).   
Party identification held to the same pattern on three of the four proffered reasons 
why people are poor.  Greater identification with the Democratic Party also meant 
respondents were more likely to attribute poverty to lousy jobs or failing schools.  
Greater identification with the Republican Party meant associating poverty with lack of 
effort by the poor.  Though Republicans were slightly more likely than Democrats to link 
poverty to loose morals or drunkenness, this tendency failed to achieve statistical 
significance (Table 2). 
The 1991 National Race and Politics Survey presented the statement “Most 
people are poor because they…” and offered a personal factors reply (don’t try hard 
enough, coded 1) and a social factors reply (don’t get the training and education they 
need, coded 2).  Democrats (N=326) and Independents (N=293) leaned toward the social 
explanation.  Both had a mean 1.87.  The 311 Republicans did not lean so heavily that 
direction, mean of 1.79 (ANOVA, Sum of Squares 1.217, df=2, Mean Square .608, 
Fisher F-value 4.602, p =.0103).  The 167 liberals had a mean 1.90, compared to 1.87 for 
moderates (N=248) and 1.78 for conservatives (N=224).  This was statistically significant 
in the expected duration (ANOVA, Sum of Squares 1.747, df=2, Mean Square .873, 
Fisher F-value 6.781, p=.0012). 
The NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy School Poll (2001) showed a clear pattern on political 
philosophy and “why poor” questions—circumstances beyond the control of the poor 
versus not doing enough to help themselves.  Self-identified liberals opted for 
circumstances beyond control 207 to 124.  Conservatives chose not doing enough self-
help 257 to 131.  Moderates split fairly closely, 263 not enough to 235 circumstances.  
The same pattern held true in political party identification.  Respondents who identified 
with the Republican Party replied “not doing enough” 337 to 164.  Democrats chose 
circumstances 362 to 235.  Independents split closely 224 not enough self-help, 216 
circumstances beyond their control. 
 The responses also can be analyzed by this scale, coding 1 for not enough self-
help, 2 for circumstances beyond their control.  By that measure declared Republicans 
averaged 1.33, Democrats 1.61, and Independents 1.49 (ANOVA, Sum of Squares 
21.256, df=2, Mean Square 10.628, Fisher F-value 44.972, p <.0001)  The means barely 
budged when the measure changed to which party the respondent felt more closely 
aligned to his or her views, Republicans 1.33, Democrats 1.61, Neither 1.49 (ANOVA, 
Sum of Squares 6.400, df=2, Mean Square 3.2, Fisher F-value 13.573, p  < .0001).  Those 
who called themselves conservative had a mean of 1.34, liberals 1.63, and moderates 1.47 
(ANOVA, Sum of Squares 14.792, df=2, Mean Square 7.396, Fisher F-value 31.133, p 
<.0001). 
The Pew Religion and Public Life Survey (2002) also confirmed the strong 
association between ideology and “why poor” answers.  The scale was from 1= very 
conservative to 5=very liberal.  One that scale respondents who said people were poor 
because of personal failings averaged 2.69 compared to a much more liberal 3.05 for 
those who credited society’s failures for poverty (t=9.3339, p < .0001). 
The results were similar for why children were being raised in poverty, 2.63 for 
personal failings, 3.03 for social and economic conditions (t=7.9984, p < .0001).  
Modifying the question to ten million American children in poverty had little effect, 
personal failings, 2.63, social/economic conditions 3.00 (t=7.5195, p < .0001). 
The results also did not change much when the respondent replies were grouped 
into a two-by-two table by political party identification.  Republicans attributed poverty 
to personal factors rather than societal ones by better than a three-to-one ratio, 303 to 90.  
Democrats also blamed personal factors, but at a much smaller ratio, 215 respondents to 
134.  (Chi-Square p-value < .0001).  Democrats split nearly evenly, 93 to 94, on personal 
versus societal reasons for children in poverty, but Republicans stuck to personal reasons, 
118 to 59 (Chi-Square p-value = .0014).  The numbers were not much different when the 
wording was modified to ten million children in poverty.  Republicans blamed personal 
factors, 139 to 65, Democrats opted for societal factors 81 to 72 (Chi-Square p-value < 
.0001). 
 Several state polls can be re-analyzed for the reasons given for poverty.  For 
example, Utah respondents (Louis Harris and Associates, 1974) gave their political 
philosophy on a scale of 1=right wing to 5=left wing.  The 356 respondents who 
attributed poverty to individual factors averaged 2.703.  The 474 who credited social 
factors averaged a more liberal 2.97726 (t=4.7033, p < .0001). 
 Political Allegiance and Political Registration in North Carolina (if scaled 
1=Democratic, 2=Independent, 3=Republican) also can be analyzed regarding poverty 
causes (KPC Research, 1988).  Concerning registration the 172 who said the poor don’t 
work hard enough to avoid poverty had a mean 1.936, compared to a more Democratic 
1.7310 for the 420 citing forces beyond the control of the poor (t=2.4336, p = .0152).  
When the question is modified to political allegiance, the gap continues, mean of 2.0539 
(N=204) for those citing “don’t work hard” compared to 1.8451 (N=536) for those saying 
“forces beyond their control”(t=2.6548, p = .0081). 
 Georgia Democrats, Republicans, and Independents were presented with the 
statement, “Lack of effort by the poor themselves is a major factor in producing poverty” 
and a response scale from one, very strongly disagree, to ten, very strongly agree 
(Applied Research Center, 1996).  The 167 Republicans registered the highest agreement 
with a mean score of 6.56.  The mean for the 245 Democrats was 5.89, and 5.99 for the 
280 Independents (ANOVA Sum of Squares 49.487m df=2, Mean Square = 24.744, 
Fisher F-value 2.892, p =.056), an overall difference just shy of statistical significance, 
but largely because of the slight difference between Democrats and Independents. 
 Two more recent Peach State Polls (Carl Vinson Institute 2002, 2004) queried 
Georgia residents about whether poverty largely is due to people not helping themselves 
or to circumstances beyond their control.  In 2002 the scale ran from 1=very conservative 
to 5=very liberal.  The 369 who chose not helping themselves averaged 2.3893 while the 
321 who opted for circumstances averaged a more liberal 2.78 (t=4.4972, p < .0001).   In 
2004 the scale was a simpler 1=conservative, 2=moderate, 3=liberal.  The 343 choosing 
not helping themselves had a mean score of 1.5945, compared to a more liberal mean of 
1.9215 for those choosing circumstances (t=5.2081, p <.0001).   
 
 Findings: Regressions 
 
 The GSS results from four potential causes were recoded and combined so that 
high scores were from citing social conditions (poor schools, insufficient jobs) and low 
scores were from citing individual failings (lazy, moral problems or drunk).  This served 
as the dependent variable.  Five independent variables were entered in a multiple 
regression.  Conservative views and strongly associating with the Republican Party 
correlated strongly with attributing poverty to individual failings, so did rising respondent 
income.  Education ran the opposite direction; greater education meant a greater tendency 
to cite social conditions for poverty.  Respondent age was not associated with reasons 
given for poverty (Table 3). 
 The 1991 National Race and Politics Survey found that conservative respondents 
were much more likely than liberals to say most people are poor because they don’t try 
hard enough.  Liberals opted for the choice that the poor do not get the training and 
education they need.  Party identification was not significant, and neither were age and 
income.  Education fell just shy of a .05 standard of significance (Table 3). 
 The NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy (2001) poll had the clearest and firmest links between 
political philosophy or party and “why poor” answers.  Liberals and Democrats opted for 
“circumstances beyond their control” while conservatives and Republicans said the poor 
aren’t doing enough to help themselves.  These relationships were significant below a 
.001 standard, while education, income, age, and religiosity were not significant at all 
(Table 3). 
 The Pew Religion and Public Life Survey (2002) had one question about why 
people are poor and another about why children grow up in poverty.  Low scores were for 
giving social reasons, high scores for individual reasons for poverty.  The combined score 
on “why poor” became the dependent variable against the independent variables of 
education, party preference, age, income, conservative to liberal philosophy, and a 
religiosity score summed from four measures (church attendance, importance of religion, 
involvement in church, and prayer).  Once again, greater education and being liberal 
correlated with societal explanations; being Republican correlated with individual 
reasons given for poverty (Table 3). 
 Several state or city polls also tend to support strong connections between 
political party/philosophy and reasons given for poverty, but with a notable exception.  
Perhaps the alignment of ideology and party were not as clear as they are now when the 
Miami Herald conducted a community poll in 1968 (Meyer, 1968).  It failed to yield a 
significant relationship between “why poor” answers and party, or four other variables 
(Table 4). 
   A Harris Poll in Utah (Louis Harris and Associates, 1974), however, found self-
identified liberals more likely to cite social reasons for poverty, compared to 
conservatives who predominantly chose personal failings.  Religiosity, age, income, and 
education were not significant factors.  A North Carolina poll (KPC Research; Charlotte 
Observer, 1988) found very strong associations between respondents who were 
Democrats and/or more highly educated and giving social reasons for poverty (Table 4). 
 Two relatively small samples from Tulsa, each with 300 respondents, yielded 
some varied findings.  Liberals in the 1985 poll were more likely than conservatives to 
blame poverty on social conditions, so were the highly educated.  Those variables, 
however, were not significant in the 1986 poll, but religiosity was significant in the 
direction that those who said religion was important in their lives were more likely to 
blame individual factors for poverty (Eckberg & Blocker, 1985; Eckberg & Blocker, 
1986).  A survey limited to Indiana Catholics found increased education strongly 
associated with social reasons given for poverty, but no significant relationships for the 
other variables tested (Davidson, 1994). 
 The Detroit Area Study (Steeh, 1994) had respondents check two factors causing 
poverty, and to check one least-important factor.  These were combined into a “why 
poor” score in which low scores meant predominantly individual reasons, and high scores 
largely social reasons.  The regression then used party identification, age, religiosity 
(church attendance plus importance of religion), education, and liberal to conservative 
political philosophy.  As in past regressions, greater education associated with social 
explanations, and Republicans opted for individual factors.  Unlike past analyses liberal-
conservative did not prove significant, but greater age associated with individual reasons 
given for poverty (Table 4). 
Three Georgia polls addressed “why poor” questions.  One in 1996 (Applied 
Research Center, 1996) found a strong link between preference for the Republican Party 
and agreement with the sentence, “Lack of effort by the poor themselves is a major factor 
in producing poverty.”  A Peach State Poll (Carl Vinson Institute of Government, 2002) 
found strong links between preference for the Democratic Party and social reasons given 
for poverty.  The same held true for those with a liberal ideology.  A later Peach State 
Poll (Carl Vinson Institute of Government, 2004) found the same link for party 




 These secondary analyses make a strong case that the answers to the question 
“why are people poor” demonstrate a clear and compelling cleavage in the American 
electorate.  One 1968 database showed no linkages between “why poor” answers and 
political philosophy or party identification.  That database may simply be an outdated 
legacy of an electorate long gone.  After all, 1968 was just at the start of Nixon’s famed 
“Southern Strategy” for re-aligning party identification; 1968 also was only a few years 
into the drift of Southern conservatives from the Democratic to Republican parties.  Self-
identification as a conservative then likely had more to do with fiscal restraint than a grab 
bag of social issues such as opposition to abortion, gay rights or civil rights. 
 Starting as early as 1974, however, these datasets show that conservatives tend to 
blame personal failings of the poor for poverty, while liberals tend to blame social 
conditions.  Since 1973 these tendencies held up at statistically significant levels (p <.05) 
in seven of nine datasets in which liberal to conservative orientation also were measured.  
In ten of the post-1973 datasets party identification was asked.  In eight of those ten, 
Democrats at statistically significant levels were more likely than Republicans to blame 
social factors rather than individual failings for poverty.  Independents typically fell 
somewhere in between.     
 Across all fourteen datasets analyzed, education was the only alternative tested 
that had much explanatory power.  The more highly educated opted for social 
explanations for poverty at statistically significant levels (p <.05) in six of the fourteen.   
Age and religiosity were associated with respondent answers for poverty in one dataset 
each.  Income never reached levels of statistical significance in any association with 
respondent answers to the causes of poverty.   
The connections become even clearer when one sets a more stringent standard for 
association.  Eight times Party ID and five times Liberal-Conservative meet a probability 
standard of less than or equal to .01.  If the standard is set at less than or equal to .001, 
Party ID meets that standard six times while Liberal-Conservative does so thrice.  
Collectively these results support both hypotheses tested in this project.  
 In light of these results the researcher conducted one more secondary analysis, 
using the American National Election Study 2004 (Krosnik & Lupia, 2004).  One must 
caution that this survey never asked about the causes of poverty.  It only had a “feeling 
thermometer,” scaled 0 to 100, and used for many groups, including poor people.  
Nevertheless, one finds a bit of an echo of the results from the other datasets.  Political 
party, running from Strongly Democratic to Strongly Republican, was associated at 
highly significant levels with the feeling thermometer regarding poor people.  Democrats 
felt more warmly toward the poor, Republicans were colder toward the poor.  Political 
philosophy, liberal to conservative, was not significant.  Income yielded confusing 
results; respondent income was associated with the feeling thermometer but household 
income was not.  These results were placed at the bottom of Table 3. 
 One cannot state how long the current state of party and ideological alignment 
will last, but these secondary analyses confirm Lakoff’s recent observations about how 
Republican/Democratic and conservative/liberal political orientations mirror a stern 
father v. nurturing family mindset.  These findings also validate the recent observation by 
Zucker and Weiner that Attribution Theory may well be at play in how people explain 
poverty.  Democrats and liberals (and the highly educated) lean toward external agents 
and outside forces.  Republicans and conservatives tend to blame the poor for their own 
plight, seeing individual failings as the primary, even sole, cause of American poverty. 
 Finally, from an ethical perspective one must note with alarm how mediated 
portrayals of poverty have tracked and mirrored, and likely exacerbated, this conservative 
alignment with a “blame the poor” perspective, and the racial stereotypes that go along 
for the ride. 
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Table 1.  General Social Survey, 1990: Political Philosophy by Reasons Why People Are 
Poor (scaled 1 very important, 2 somewhat important, 3 not important) 
  
Personal:   Lack of Effort*     Loose Morals** Social:     Poor Schools*   Lousy Jobs** 
 
Extremely  
Liberal                         1.86               2.34 
 
Liberal                         1.86               2.08 
 
Slightly 
Liberal                         1.67               1.90 
 
Moderate                     1.59               1.86 
 
Slightly 
Conservative               1.56               1.85 
 
Conservative               1.54               1.72 
 
Extremely 
Conservative               1.53               1.62 
 
 
                     1.64                1.55 
                      
                     1.61                1.66 
                     
  
                     1.82                1.80 
                      
                     1.88                1.88 
                      
 
                     1.95                1.94 
                     
                     1.95                1.92 
                      
 
                     2.00                1.89 
 
* ANOVA Sum of Squares 13.617, df=6, 
Mean Square 2.269, Fisher F-value 5.548, 
p=.000. 
* ANOVA Sum of Squares 14.876, 
df=6, Mean Square 4.207, Fisher F-
value 4.207, p=.003. 
** ANOVA Sum of Squares 22.230, df=6, 
Mean Square 3.705, Fisher F-value 5.934, 
p=.000. 
**ANOVA Sum of Squares 11.942, 
df=6, Mean Square 3.574, Fisher F-




Table 2.  General Social Survey,1990: Party Identification by Reasons Why People Are 
Poor (scaled 1 very important, 2 somewhat important, 3 not important) 
 
Personal:   Lack of Effort*    Loose Morals** Social:     Poor Schools*     Lousy Jobs** 
 
Strong 
Democrat                     1.75               1.98 
 
Weak 
Democrat                     1.63               1.90 
 
Independent 
Leans Democratic       1.75               1.82 
 
Independent                1.61               1.77 
 
Independent 
Leans Republican       1.57               1.85 
 
Weak 
Republican                 1.55               1.87 
 
Strong 




                     1.68                1.61 
                    
   
                     1.84                1.77 
                     
  
                     1.79                1.82 
                      
                     1.86                1.82 
                      
 
                     1.94                1.89 
                     
                     
                     1.95                1.95 
                      
 
                     2.03                2.13 
 
* ANOVA Sum of Squares 7.741, df=6, 
Mean Square 1.290, Fisher F-value 3.193, 
p=.004. 
* ANOVA Sum of Squares 13.525, df=6, 
Mean Square 2.254, Fisher F-value 
3.863, p=.001. 
**ANOVA Sum of Squares 5.193, df=6, 
Mean Square .866, Fisher F-value 1.370, 
p=.223. 
** ANOVA Sum of Squares 26.856, 
df=6, Mean Square 4.476, Fisher F-value 
8.383, p=.000. 
 
Table 3.  National Surveys, Multiple Regression on Reasons Given for Poverty 
  (Individual versus Social) and Political/Other Variables 
 
Survey/Variable  B Std. Error Std. Beta t  Sig. (p) 
 
1990 
GSS/Liberal-Conservative -.186 .042  -.163  -.4.474  .000 
GSS/Party ID   -.103 .028  -.133  -.3.672  .000 
GSS/Education  .060 .021  .101  2.845  .005 
GSS/Income   -.056 .016  -.120  -3.405  .001 
GSS/Age   -.003 .004  -.027  -.795  .427 
 
1991 
Race/Liberal-Conservative -.059 .021  -.127  -2.895  .004 
Race/Party ID: D to R  -.001 .019  -.001  -.029  .977 
Race/Education  .026 .013  .084  1.932  .054 
Race/Income   -.006 .004  -.057  -1.320  .188 
Race/Age   -.001 .001  -.127  1.296  .195 
 
2001 
NPR/Liberal-Conservative -.082 .033  -.124  6.299  .000 
NPR/Party ID: R to D  .287 .051  .283  5.648  .000 
NPR/Religiosity  -.021 .047  -.021  -.449  .654 
NPR/Education  .018 .015  .059  1.194  .233 
NPR/Income   -.065 .048  -.066  -1.340  .181 
NPR/Age   .002 .001  .064  1.334  .183  
 
2002 
Pew/Conservative-Liberal -.036 .014  -.066  -2.604  .009 
Pew/Party ID   .106 .013  .201  8.020  .000 
Pew/Religiosity  .004 .003  .029  1.334  .182 
Pew/Education  -.031 .006  -.114  -5.050  .000 
Pew/Income   -.004 .004  -.023  -1.004  .315 
Pew/Age   .001 .001  .031  1.435  .151 
 
-- 
* ANES (Measured Poor People in a Feeling Thermometer rather than Poverty Reasons) 
 
2004 
ANES/Liberal-Conservative .853 .591  .068  1.442  .150 
ANES/Party ID: D to R -1.322 ,492  -.154  -3.287  .001 
ANES/Education  -.236 .481  -.020  -.490  .624 
ANES/Resp. Income  -.453 .146  -.158  -3.104  .002 
ANES/HH Income  .019 .163  .006  .116  .908 
ANES/Age   .052 .043  .046  1.217  .224  
 
 
Table 4.  State or Metro Surveys, Multiple Regression on Reasons Given for Poverty 
  (Individual versus Social) and Political/Other Variables 
 
Survey/Variable   B   Std. Error   Std. Beta t Sig. (p) 
 
Miami’68/Party ID: D to R  -.025 .027 -.050  -.916  .360 
Miami’68/Religiosity   -.054 .049 -.061  -1.099  .272 
Miami’68/Education   -.040 .034 -.071  -1.190  .235 
Miami’68/Income    -.007 .029 -.014  -.241  .810 
Miami’68/Age   .000 .003 .007  .123  .902 
 
Utah’74/Conservative-Liberal .091 .024 .137  3.817  .000 
Utah’74/Religiosity   .019 .019 .035  .975  .330 
Utah’74/Education   .004 .012 .012  .314  .754 
Utah’74/Income    -.016 .012 -.052  -1.381  .168 
Utah’74/Age    -.016 .009 -.062  -1.729  .084 
 
Tulsa’85/Conservative-Liberal .153 .070 .139  2.179  .030 
Tulsa’85/Religiosity   -.072 .047 -.098  -1.526  .128 
Tulsa’85/Education   .153 .048 .205  3.151  .002 
Tulsa’85/Income   .045 .026 .111  1.725  .086 
Tulsa’85/Age    .003 .003 .057  .888  .375 
 
Tulsa’86/Conservative-Liberal .102 .062 .105  1.648  .101 
Tulsa’86/Religiosity   -.097 .043 -.147  -2.259  .025 
Tulsa’86/Education   .022 .039 .038  .573  .567 
Tulsa’86/Income   .006 .022 .019  .286  .775 
Tulsa’86/Age    -.005 .003 -.119  -1.838  .067 
 
NC’89/Party ID: R to D  .057 .018 .124  3.256  .001 
NC’89/Education   .069 .017 .177  4.121  .000 
NC’89/Income    -.024 .017 -.057  -1.347  .178 
NC’89/Age    -.002 .001 -.060  -1.558  .120 
 
IN-Catholic’94/Party ID: D to R -.048 .209 -.006  -.228  .819 
IN-Catholic’94/Religiosity  -.069 .117 -.015  -.592  .554 
IN-Catholic’94/Education  .502 .075 .196  6.657  .000 
IN-Catholic’94/Income  -.397 .364 -.116  -1.091  .276 
IN-Catholic’94/Age   -.002 .007 -.007  -.249  .804 
 
Detroit’94/Conservative-Liberal -.033 .040 -.042  -.840  .401 
Detroit’94/Party ID   .231 .067 .171  3.430  .001 
Detroit’94/Religiosity   .007 .024 .015  .306  .760 
Detroit’94/Education   .057 .022 .128  2.595  .010 
Detroit’94/Age   -.007 .003 -.120  -2.142  .016 
 
GA’96/Party ID: R to D  -.432 .161 -.112  -2.692  .007 
GA’96Religiosity   .113 .105 .046  1.081  .280 
GA’96/Education   -.144 .106 -.062  -1.364  .173 
GA’96/Income    -.069 .092 -.035  -.756  .450 
GA’96/Age    .008 .009 .041  .974  .330 
 
GA’02/Liberal-Conservative  .069 .028 .109  2.476  .014 
GA’02/Party ID: R to D  .151 .026 .253  5.757  .000 
GA/’02/Education   .001 .023 .003  .063  .950 
GA’02/Income    -.031 .016 -.091  -1.970  .049 
GA’02/Age    -.019 .014 -.058  -1.365  .173 
 
GA’04/Conservative-Liberal  .005 .014 .013  .322  .747 
GA’04/Party ID   .216 .025 .361  8.581  .000 
GA’04/Education   .035 .021 .072  1.667  .096 
GA’04/Income    -.033 .014 -.102  -2.329  .020 
GA’04/Age    -.012 .013 -.038  -.938  .349 
